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t is often claimed that the de-
velopment of nano-technol-
ogy will constitute a “tech-
nological revolution” with 
profound social, economic, 
and political consequences. The im-
plications of this claim can be illus-
trated by a scenario in which a po-
litical revolutionary made the same 
claims that are commonly made by 
enthusiasts for nanotechnology. Most 
people would be outraged to learn 
that the members of an unelected 
group were planning to radically re-
shape society in this fashion. I sur-
vey arguments that might be used 
to block this analogy and argue that 
none of them justify drawing a sharp 
distinction between social change 
due to technology and change due 
to other political causes. Two things 
follow from this discussion: First, we 
need to reconsider the appropriate-
ness of the language of technologi-
cal revolution when talking about 
nanotechnology. The likely impacts 
of nanotechnology may be less dra-
matic than is often claimed. Second, 
if we do decide that the language of 
revolution is appropriate for nano-
technology, then we should acknowl-
edge that any such revolution should 
be delayed until the public can make 
a democratic decision about whether 
they wish their lives to be trans-
formed in this way. 
Nanotechnology Revolution
Nanotechnology, the science 
of developing tools and ma-
chines as small as one mol-
ecule, will have as big an 
impact on our lives as tran-
sistors and chips did in the 
past 40 years. Imagine high-
ly specialized machines you 
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ingest, systems for security 
smaller than a piece of dust 
and collectively intelligent 
household appliances and 
cars. The implications for 
defense, public safety and 
health are astounding.
Newt Gingrich, former 
Speaker of the U.S. 
House of Representa-
tives [24]
The next Industrial revolu-
tion is right around the cor-
ner. Fourth generation nano-
technology — molecular 
manufacturing — will radi-
cally transform the world, 
and the people, of the early 
21st century. 
Center for Responsible 
Nanotechnology [9]
Barring worldwide destruc-
tion or worldwide controls, 
the technology race will 
continue whether we wish 
it or not. And as advances 
in computer-aided design 
speed the development of 
molecular tools, the advance 
toward assemblers will 
quicken.… They promise to 
bring changes as profound 
as the industrial revolu-
tion, antibiotics, and nuclear 
weapons all rolled up in one 
massive breakthrough.
K.E. Drexler [14]
Imagine that you come 
home one night and turn on the 
television to relax in front of 
your favorite talk-show. The host 
is interviewing a bearded man 
you don’t recognize and whose 
name you have never heard 
before. The topic of the interview 
catches your attention though: 
This mysterious bearded figure 
is announcing a revolution!
This revolution will, he says, 
“change the world” ([3], [5], [6, 
pp. 1-47], [12], [14]-[16], [29]-
[33], [40], [42], [45], [46], [48], 
[49], [61], [69].1 It will be a global 
revolution, respecting no national 
boundaries ([14], [32], [66]). It 
will totally change social relations, 
fundamentally altering the way 
we live. It will provide wealth for 
all ([12], [14]- [16]). It will feed 
the poor and bring succour to the 
sick [12]. It will heal the planet, 
restoring the natural environment 
and providing clean drinking water 
and energy for remote communities 
([11], [34], [38, pp. 5-7], [52], [53], 
[60]. It will even improve human 
nature, making people both smarter 
and longer-lived ([12], [40], [47]). 
His enthusiasm is contagious—
although you also notice that he is 
a little short on specifics as to how 
this revolution will achieve these 
things.
When pressed, he admits that 
there will in fact be winners and 
losers in this revolution. It is likely 
that it will lead to severe social 
disruption, including the closure 
of some industries, putting tens of 
thousands of people out of work ([2, 
pp. 37-38], [9], [11], [ 13], [38], [41], 
[70, p. 42]). He assures viewers that 
these people will be appropriately 
compensated and will be “better off 
in the end.” However, he continues 
— and here his voice becomes grave 
— it would be irresponsible of him to 
guarantee that no lives will be lost. 
Some people may die as mistakes 
are made on the road to progress. 
You can’t make an omelette without 
breaking eggs.
The TV host suggests that 
it would be better to proceed 
cautiously rather than advance 
headlong, putting lives at risk. 
Perhaps we should not proceed 
until we know that the plans for 
a bloodless transfer of power are 
secure.
The revolutionary guffaws. “If 
people had waited until revolution 
was safe, we would never have had 
any revolutions. We must trust in 
our judgement that our cause is 
just” ([8], [26], [62]). As he says 
this, you realize that he has a slight 
American accent. 
The host demands to know more 
about this group of revolutionaries: 
Who are they? Where do they come 
from? Are they elected?
At this point the revolutionary 
shifts in his chair. “Unfortunately, 
we cannot be elected. The masses 
are not educated enough to be 
trusted to make the decisions we 
must make. Becoming a member 
of our organization takes years of 
training” [1].
“But it is open to the public?”
“I am afraid not. The tests for 
entry are arduous and we are 
forced to reject many who might 
wish to be involved.”
“So what sort of people are 
members? Are there as many 
women as men? Are there ordinary 
people in your organization?” 
The revolutionary looks even more 
uncomfortable. “Our members are 
mainly men,” he admits. “They are of 
necessity an elite group” [4], [44].
Eventually, the “revolutionary” 
is forced to admit that his 
organization consists largely of 
professional people drawn from 
universities and government, and 
includes many senior executives 
drawn from some of the largest 
multinational corporations in the 
world.
Perhaps the public does 
not want a revolution, the host 
suggests, especially one led by 
such a privileged group. 
Her guest is unfazed. The forces of 
history are, he insists, on his and his 
fellow revolutionaries’ side. Staring 
earnestly at the camera, he declares 
“Our revolution is inevitable” ([12, 
p. 194], [23, pp. 187-188], [39], [42], 
[64, pp. 12, 188]).
 “So what you are saying,” 
suggests the host, “is that a self-
selected, elite group, including 
1Sources provided for the claims made in italics in 
this “hypothetical” refer to contributions to debates 
about nanotechnology or about science and engi-
neering more generally which contain the claims 
paraphrased and/or parodied in the hypothetical. 
Where the claims made by the “revolutionary” are 
mild parodies of claims made in the debate about 
nanotechnology, the reference is intended to dem-
onstrate that the caricature is nevertheless an ac-
curate one.
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representatives of some of the 
wealthiest and most powerful 
people on the planet, is planning to 
fundamentally change the world, 
without consulting anyone outside 
of their political movement.”
How would you react to such 
news? I suspect you would be 
outraged to learn that the members 
of an unelected group were planning 
to radically reshape society and 
would demand that they be stopped. 
However, a technological revolution is 
precisely what the public is expected 
to embrace in the current debate 
about nanotechnology. The above 
scenario simply transposes claims 
about nanotechnology into the 
political realm. As the sources cited 
above demonstrate, the claim that 
nanotechnology heralds a revolution 
appears in the popular press, scientific 
journals, government reports, and the 
remarks of reputable scientists, as well 
as in the writings of more speculative 
“nanofuturists” such as Drexler and 
Crandall.2 Yet, the demand that any 
such revolution be stopped, at least 
until the public has had a chance to 
make a democratic decision about 
whether they wish their lives to be 
transformed in this way, receives scant 
consideration in most discussions of 
the future of nanotechnology. 
Political vs. 
Technological Revolution
Why is there such a disjunction be-
tween our attitudes towards politi-
cal and technological revolution? 
Thinking about this question is a 
useful exercise when considering 
how a democratic society should 
negotiate issues relating to science 
and technology [68, pp. 99-102] 
and, in particular, when consider-
ing how we should respond to the 
“nanotechnological revolution.”
Perhaps many of us don’t worry 
about the possibility that our lives will 
be transformed by a revolutionary 
new technology, without our consent, 
is because we take their claims, 
about technological revolution with 
a large grain of salt. A genuinely 
revolutionary technology would 
fundamentally change the way 
society is organized and the way 
people live.3 Yet, despite all the new 
technologies developed over the last 
40 years, the basic form of human 
life, at least in industrialized nations, 
has remained more or less the same. 
The vast majority of people spend 
most of their time working for other 
people. In the industrialized world, 
they live in houses, work in offices 
or factories, and commute to work 
by car or train. robots do not do 
our house work. Cancer continues 
to kill. Poverty, disease, and famine 
still stalk the Third World. Our 
society has not become noticeably 
more rational or democratic. This 
is not to deny that society has 
changed as a result of the impact of 
new technologies. However, it is to 
insist that these changes have been 
relatively superficial [18]. 
I have limited my claim 
about the superficial nature 
of the impact of technology 
to the last 40 years—and to 
the industrialized nations—
deliberately, because the claim 
that technologies changed the 
world prior to this period is 
more plausible. Antiseptics and 
antibiotics, public health, reliable 
forms of contraception, railroads, 
and the internal combustion 
engine all had an enormous 
impact on the basic form of 
human life in the 18th, 19th, and 
early 20th-century, significantly 
lengthening the average lifespan, 
transforming relations between 
the sexes, and making it possible 
for the majority of the population 
to live in cities rather than in 
the country. Compared to these 
technologies, the information 
and biotechnology “revolutions” 
have to date had comparatively 
little impact on social or political 
relations [18]. 
This skeptical response to 
claims about revolutionary tech-
nologies rests on the belief that 
such technologies are unlikely 
to live up to their name, either 
because their potential has been 
over-hyped, or because they will 
leave the fundamental form of our 
way of life unchanged [18], [55]. 
It therefore offers little comfort to 
those who genuinely believe that 
nanotechnology will change the 
world. However, to the extent that we 
do believe that nanotechnology will 
transform our lives, it seems that we 
should be equally concerned about 
who is shaping this transformation.
Government/ 
Corporate Planning 
for New Technologies 
I suspect that a second reason 
people respond differently to the 
prospect of technological revolution 
and political revolution is that we 
don’t usually think of technological 
revolution as involving other people 
exercising power over us. People 
tend to react badly to conspirators 
and, more generally, to the thought 
that other people are making plans 
which will affect them without 
their knowledge. Yet, we tend not 
to think of technological change 
as resulting from plans that others 
have made without consulting us. 
Instead, we imagine that technology 
just “happens” [39].
However, as the scenario above 
suggests, there is planning involved 
in introducing new technologies. 
Many of the reports that have been 
commissioned into nanotechnology 
over the last decade are examples 
of precisely this — of governments 
taking conscious political action in 
relation to a new technology ([31], 
[41], [42], [52], [69]). Govern-
ments invest in some technologies 
and not others. They have industry, 
research, and telecommunication 
strategies. They pass laws requir-
ing the use of some technologies 
2For further discussion of the role played by 
claims about the “revolutionary” nature of nano-
technology in debates about nanotechnology, see 
Sparrow [58]
3Note that according to this measure many po-
litical revolutions have equally failed to live up 
to the name.
40  | IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE  |  SuMMEr 2008
and prohibiting the use of others. 
In all these ways and more, govern-
ments plan and shape our techno-
logical future. 
Such planning also goes on in the 
“private” sphere. Large corporations 
such as Microsoft, Xerox, and 
IBM choose to research certain 
technologies, to bring certain tech-
nologies to market, and to abandon 
others. They establish research 
laboratories, research programs, and 
production facilities to bring their 
plans to fruition ([6, p. 221], [19, pp. 
57-68]). Planning for technological 
“development” also goes on between 
corporations. Industry groups 
and conferences are organized to 
develop industry standards and to 
lobby governments to invest in the 
infrastructure and the regulations 
necessary for their preferred tech-
nologies to flourish [63]. The idea 
that technological development just 
“happens” is a myth.
That may be true, a critic might 
respond, but it is still the case that 
there is no one group in charge of 
developing nanotechnology and 
therefore no one group exercising 
power over us. 
However, the absence of a single 
organized group controlling the 
nanotechnological revolution fails 
to distinguish this revolution from 
political revolutions. Most political 
revolutions are the result of 
widespread social movements that 
emerge in times of social crisis, 
without any central organization. 
Those few groups who are 
consciously fomenting revolution 
seldom make the revolution go 
entirely according to a single plan. 
Yet because those groups are 
making plans, they are likely to 
exercise more influence over the 
revolution than others not making 
plans for the revolution.
The number of actors involved 
in introducing technological change 
is actually quite small, especially 
when considered on a global scale. 
A relatively small and homogeneous 
group of people — scientists, 
engineers, entrepreneurs, and bureau-
crats — are making decisions that 
will shape the development and 
application of nanotechnology [21], 
[67]. If it is true that nanotechnology 
will change the world then, as a 
group, these people clearly do have 
the power to transform our lives. We 
should be just as concerned about 
their identity and politics as we would 
those of any other revolutionary 
group.
Sense of Inevitability
Another reason people might not 
worry about technological revo-
lution is that they feel that such 
change is — as the revolutionary in 
my hypothetical scenario insisted 
— inevitable ([12, p. 194], [23, pp. 
187-188], [42], [64, pp. 12, 188]). 
We can’t do anything about it, so 
why worry about it?
On the face of it, this is an odd 
response to reports of an imminent 
revolution. History is as full of 
political revolutions as it is of 
technological revolutions. Yet few 
people would, I think, respond to news 
of an imminent political revolution 
with a shrug and the observation that 
“revolution is inevitable.”
Moreover, the supposed inevita-
bility of technological change is much 
exaggerated. Most of human history 
has not consisted of wave after wave of 
unimpeded technological change. The 
current pace of technological change 
reflects existing social, political, and 
economic arrangements, which are 
the products of human choices [50, 
p. 1007]. Humanity could — and 
occasionally does — collectively turn 
away from particular technologies, 
as it has by-and-large from chemical 
and biological weapons, and — more 
recently — from reproductive human 
cloning [2], [23, pp. 188-189].
It is true that attempts to regulate 
technology often raise difficult 
collective action problems. Even if a 
community as a whole decides it does 
not want a particular technology, 
individuals or factions within the 
community may feel that it is in 
their interest to develop it. The first 
people to adopt a new technology 
often gain a competitive advantage 
over those who do not have access 
to it. Individuals may further reason 
that, “If we don’t develop/use this 
technology someone else will — and 
then we will lose out” [17], [35, 
pp.114-117], [57, p. 147-148], [67, pp. 
277-278]. If everyone follows this 
reasoning, the technology infiltrates 
the community. This may happen 
even if the entirely predictable 
result is that once the competitive 
advantage disappears nobody is any 
better off than before; indeed it may 
happen even where the result is that 
everyone is worse off than before! 
The collective action problems 
involved in regulating technology 
are especially acute when the 
community concerned is a global 
one, so that individuals have few 
ways of knowing whether others are 
abiding by the collective decision, 
and have reduced confidence in the 
community’s capacity to enforce its 
decision [9].
However, collective action 
problems of this sort are the meat 
and potatoes of politics [28], [56]. 
If we stopped trying to exercise 
collective control over our destiny 
whenever it was difficult due 
to the existence of competing 
interests, we would soon have no 
social institutions at all. There are 
many situations where what it is 
individually rational and what is best 
for the group differ. The solution to 
collective action problems which 
relate to technology is the same 
as the solution to other collective 
action problems: empower the 
community to reshape the incentive 
structures of its members so that it 
is easier for individuals to trust that 
others will abide by the decision of 
the collective. This is the solution 
that governments and international 
bodies have adopted in several 
notable cases where they have set 
out to prohibit certain technologies 
including, for instance, chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons. 
If such regulation is difficult to 
achieve at an international level, 
this only draws attention to the 
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need for stronger institutions of 
democratic governance at a global 
level in order to make effective 
collective decisions possible.
It is untrue that as a society, or 
even as an international order of 
societies, we are necessarily unable 
to control the development and 
application of new technologies 
[23, pp. 188-189]; [37, pp. 167-
205]. It may be difficult to do so, 
but these difficulties are similar to 
the difficulties facing communities 
and governments across a wide 
range of policy areas. Our passivity 
in the face of social change due to 
technological revolution is a form 
of “learned helplessness.”
Optimism About “Progress”
Another possible explanation as 
to why we are not as apprehensive 
about technological as political 
revolutions is that most of us share 
a deep-seated culturally-ingrained 
belief in technological “progress” 
[25], [38, p. 17], [42, p. 8], [54], 
[68, p. 5]. As a consequence, we 
are inclined to view each new tech-
nology as a better technology and 
a society with better technology as 
a better society. In fact, how to as-
sess the ultimate impact of any par-
ticular technology on human hap-
piness and well-being is a difficult 
and controversial question. Putting 
this aside for the moment, it is clear 
that technological change produces 
losers as well as winners [13]. It is 
at the very least an open question 
whether or not the majority of ordi-
nary citizens will be winners from 
a technology which is being shaped 
by some of the wealthiest and most 
powerful corporations in the world 
[21], [59], [67]. The idea that tech-
nological change will automati-
cally make all of us, or even most 
of us, better off is naive.
Our culture’s optimism about 
technology is also looking less 
and less justified in the face of the 
accelerating global environmental 
crisis [65]. Considering their environ-
mental impacts, we might well have 
been better off if we had rejected, for 
example, the technology of private 
motor vehicles and coal-fired power 
stations. The length of the period 
between the development of these 
technologies and the arrival of the 
consequences of their adoption has 
allowed our optimism to flourish 
unchecked by important realities. 
As the reality of global warming, 
in particular, intrudes upon our 
awareness, we may be forced to 
revise our belief that all technological 
change constitutes progress.
In any case, the fact that we 
ourselves judge that a particular 
technological change is for the 
better should not be enough to 
reconcile us to the prospect of such 
change where it is directed by the 
choices of others. revolutionaries 
tend to believe that their revolutions 
will make everyone better off. Yet 
action to bring about a revolution 
on the basis of this optimism is 
justified only if it is legitimated 
by the consent of the majority of 
citizens.
Consumers and “Free Choice”
This brings us to the final possible 
explanation for our apparent calm 
in the face of the prospect of radi-
cal technological change: the belief 
that technological change is already 
an essentially democratic process. 
Because, as individuals, we have had 
the experience of embracing new 
technologies by buying the latest 
gadgets, it is easy to assume that new 
technologies only come into being 
as a result of demand from consum-
ers, and that this makes the process 
a democratic one. unfortunately, nei-
ther of these assumptions is true.
While the “free market” 
plays a crucial role in driving 
technological change, the 
desires of consumers play only 
a minor part in this process. As 
consumers, individuals express 
their preferences amongst the 
technologies made available to 
them rather than the full range 
of possible technologies. For 
the most part, then, consumer 
demand follows technological 
change rather than drives it. Nor 
are all persons equal when it 
comes to those decisions which do 
influence the nature and direction 
of technological change. For 
instance, the decisions of an Apple 
marketing manager or engineer 
are vastly more important in 
determining the design of digital 
music players than the decisions 
of a consumer who buys an iPod. 
Most technological revolutions 
are shaped by the choices of 
producers, or by governments, 
rather than by the choices of 
consumers [43], [51, esp. pp. 9-23], 
[68, pp. 22-29]. The circumstances 
of unrestricted competition in 
which these decisions are made 
are often such that corporations 
and governments themselves 
feel that they have little choice 
but to develop and adopt new 
technologies. So important is 
the role played by competition 
in shaping these decisions that 
it is fair to say that the direction 
and pace of technological change 
today is largely driven by the 
economic order — capitalism 
— itself.
More importantly, even if we 
do wish to insist that technological 
trajectories ultimately reflect 
the choices of individuals, the 
circumstances in which individuals 
have an opportunity to express 
their desires in relation to a new 
technology matter. Democracy 
requires collective decision-making, 
which in turn requires public 
discussion and debate [10], [22], 
[27], [69, p. 40]. Collective decision-
making, along with the possibility of 
establishing institutions to enact and 
enforce the decisions, is necessary 
in order to avoid the destructive 
effects of collective action problems 
of the sort discussed above [28], 
[56]. In the absence of the capacity 
to make a collective decision, the 
circumstances in which individuals 
make decisions structure the 
decisions rather than, as should 
be the case, the other way around. 
Democracy allows societies to 
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determine their own destiny even in 
circumstances where the interests of 
individuals conflict.
If the role of market forces was 
enough to render technological 
change democratic then we could rest 
easy in the faith that change will not 
happen unless “we” want it. However, 
as argued above, free markets and 
democracies are different things. 
The outcome of individual choices 
aggregated by the mechanism of the 
market will often be very different 
to that which we would have chosen 
through a democratic process.
Reconsidering Revolution
It seems then that none of the con-
siderations I have surveyed here 
justify drawing a sharp distinction 
between change due to technology 
and change due to other political 
causes. At least two things follow 
from this conclusion for discus-
sions of the social impact of nano-
technology. 
First, we need to reconsider the 
appropriateness of the language 
of technological revolution when 
talking about nanotechnology. The 
development of new, improved 
technologies may have little impact 
on the fundamental nature of human 
lives. It may be that on a more sober 
evaluation of the likely impacts 
of nanotechnology we realize that 
they will be less dramatic than the 
quotations above suggest. This 
would mitigate — but not entirely 
eliminate — the need to consult the 
public about whether they wish to 
experience these impacts. Of course, 
it would also cast doubt on the 
urgency with which governments are 
pursuing nanotechnology and on the 
amount of funding being dedicated 
to nanotechnology research and 
development.
Second, if we do decide that 
the language of revolution is 
appropriate when talking about 
nanotechnology then we should 
acknowledge that this has significant 
implications. To the extent that 
it is true that nanotechnology 
will change the world, we should 
be just as concerned about this 
prospect as we would be if it were 
an approaching political revolution 
of the more familiar sort. 
Let us return to the scenario with 
which I started this paper. What 
would we demand if we learned that 
an unelected cabal was initiating a 
political revolution? It would not be 
unreasonable, I think, to demand that 
these revolutionaries be arrested. 
They should certainly be stopped 
from carrying out their revolution 
until their plans can be opened up to 
public scrutiny and, if necessary, put 
to a vote. What’s more, this demand 
would hardly be controversial. It 
follows straightforwardly from 
the fact that an unelected group is 
threatening to wield power outside 
of the democratic process. If the duly 
elected government was unwilling to 
protect us from these self-appointed 
revolutionaries, we would properly 
question its legitimacy.
Thus, if we are on the verge of a 
nanotechnological revolution (as many 
nanotechnology researchers have 
declared), it follows similarly that those 
researchers should be prevented from 
radically transforming our world until 
we, as a society, have had the chance 
to consider whether we desire this 
transformation. Organizations already 
planning this revolution should be 
required to submit their plans to the 
public for scrutiny and approval. 
If these measures sound like an 
infringement of researchers’ liberty 
then we would do well to keep in 
mind the right of the rest of the 
population not to be subjected to a 
revolution without their consent. If 
we feel it will be difficult to prevent 
a nanotechnological revolution 
because of the difficulties involved 
in regulating technology, then we 
must strengthen the institutions 
of democratic control necessary 
to accomplish such regulation [2], 
[36], [38], [57, pp. 145-150], [67]. 
The alternative is to give over 
control of our future to unelected 
techno-revolutionaries.
Pausing at crucial points 
to allow for public reflection 
will necessarily slow down the 
development of nanotechnology. 
However,  i f  nanotechnology 
really will be as wonderful as 
its proponents suggest, then the 
public will presumably recognize 
its advantages and eventual ly 
embrace the nanotechnological 
revolution. A short delay seems a 
small price to pay to ensure that the 
consequences of nanotechnology 
are indeed beneficial and that these 
benefits are thought to be worth 
whatever other social impacts 
occur in the their pursuit. More 
importantly, it is a price we have to 
pay if we wish to continue to claim 
to be a democratic society while 
at the same time allowing that our 
society will be transformed by the 
introduction of nanotechnology.
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